The dynamics of urban traffic congestion and the price of parking

Fosgerau, Mogens; de Palma, André · 2013 · OpenAlex-citations

DOI: 10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.06.008

archive: archived pipeline: cataloged verified

Get this paper ↗ (DOI — opens at the source; we link to it, we don't host it)

Summary

This paper investigates the efficacy of time-varying parking fees as a politically feasible alternative to congestion tolls for managing urban traffic dynamics. While optimal time-varying tolls can theoretically eliminate queuing by dispersing trip timing, they face significant political resistance. The authors argue that parking fees, which are already widely implemented and technologically simpler, can serve as a substitute policy to influence the scheduling of commutes and reduce congestion costs. The study employs a generalized Vickrey bottleneck model to analyze commuter behavior. The model assumes a continuum of drivers with identical preferences regarding trip timing and cost, facing a bottleneck with fixed capacity. Congestion arises when the arrival rate exceeds capacity, resulting in queuing delays. The authors compare three scenarios: an unregulated equilibrium, an optimal time-varying toll at the bottleneck, and an optimal time-varying parking fee at the destination. Unlike tolls, which can vary freely, parking fees accumulate at a non-negative rate, meaning the total fee is always lower for later arrivals. This structural constraint limits the flexibility of parking fees compared to tolls. The results demonstrate that an optimal parking fee cannot fully replicate the efficiency of a congestion toll in isolation. The optimal strategy involves charging a zero parking fee rate during an initial interval where queuing occurs, ensuring all drivers in this period pay the same total fee. Once the queue dissipates, the fee rate becomes positive to maintain zero queuing for the remainder of the commute. Consequently, the departure interval shifts later, and while queuing is reduced, it is not entirely eliminated during the peak. The welfare gain from this optimal parking fee is strictly less than that of an optimal toll, capturing a fraction of the potential efficiency gains depending on driver preferences for earliness versus lateness. However, the paper identifies conditions under which parking fees can achieve full efficiency. If some drivers have private parking and cannot be charged, they naturally travel during the zero-fee, queuing interval, allowing the policy to remain effective for the rest of the population without reducing welfare gains. Furthermore, when considering both morning and evening commutes simultaneously, the interaction between the two periods allows a parking fee scheme to completely remove congestion for both commutes. This finding suggests that while parking fees are less flexible than tolls for single-period analysis, they can be a powerful tool for comprehensive urban traffic management when applied across the full daily cycle.

Provenance

The full processing record for this entry. Every stage of this paper's journey through the pipeline is logged — what ran, with which tool and model, how many attempts it took, and when it last completed.

Summary generated by qwen3.6-27b-prismaquant on 2026-06-26; verification: verified.

Topics

Ranked by relevance to this paper. Hover a topic for its definition.

• traffic density