Clever homunculus: Is there an endogenous act of control in the explicit task-cuing procedure?

Logan, Gordon D.; Bundesen, Claus · 2003 · OpenAlex-citations

DOI: 10.1037/0096-1523.29.3.575

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Summary

This paper investigates whether the explicit task-cuing procedure in cognitive psychology requires an endogenous act of executive control, specifically a mental "switch" when tasks alternate. The authors address a longstanding controversy regarding why reaction times (RT) are typically slower on trials where the task alternates compared to trials where it repeats. While some researchers attribute this difference to an executive cost of reconfiguring mental sets, others suggest it results from interference or benefits associated with repetition. Logan and Bundesen propose two competing formal models to explain the time course of RT as a function of the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between cue and target. Model 1 assumes an endogenous act of control where an executive process retrieves and instantiates a new task set during alternations. Model 2 assumes no such executive act; instead, it posits that faster RTs on repetition trials arise from a perceptual benefit where the cue matches a short-term memory representation from the previous trial, accelerating encoding. The study employed five experiments using explicit task-cuing paradigms where participants performed magnitude, parity, or form judgments on numerical targets preceded by cues. The experimental design manipulated the SOA and, in Experiments 1 and 2, masked the cues to prolong encoding time. In Experiments 3 and 4, the authors used distinct cues for each task to dissociate cue repetition from task repetition. The authors fitted their data to Model 1, Model 2, and a hybrid Model 2+1. Critical predictions involved the interaction between cue masking and trial type (repetition vs. alternation). Model 1 predicted an overadditive interaction, whereas Model 2 predicted an underadditive interaction due to the disproportionate impact of masking on the short-term memory match benefit. The results consistently supported Model 2 and falsified Model 1. In Experiments 1 and 2, cue masking interacted underadditively with repetition and alternation effects, aligning with Model 2’s prediction that masking disproportionately disrupts the encoding benefit on repetition trials. In Experiments 3 and 4, RT was slower for task repetition than for cue repetition and comparable to task alternation, further contradicting the executive switch hypothesis of Model 1. The data indicated that the performance difference between repetition and alternation is driven by a benefit on repetition trials rather than a cost on alternation trials. The significance of these findings lies in challenging the assumption that explicit task-cuing involves an endogenous executive act of control. The authors conclude that the "clever homunculus" or executive agent is not required to explain the RT differences in this procedure. Instead, the observed effects are attributable to more mundane perceptual processes, specifically the facilitation of cue encoding through short-term memory matching. This suggests that previous interpretations of task-switching costs may have misattributed perceptual benefits to executive control mechanisms, necessitating a reevaluation of models regarding executive function and task switching.

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• task switching