Post-error recklessness and the hot hand

Williams, Paul; Heathcote, Andrew; Nesbitt, Keith; Eidels, Ami · 2016 · Judgment and Decision Making

DOI: 10.1017/s1930297500007282

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Summary

This study investigates the relationship between post-error slowing and the "hot hand" phenomenon, two sequential dependencies in performance that have historically been studied in isolation. Post-error slowing refers to increased response times following errors, while the hot hand describes improved performance following success, often observed in sports but frequently dismissed as a fallacy in controlled settings. The authors aimed to bridge these domains by examining how success and failure influence subsequent behavior in a task allowing participants to control difficulty through response timing. Specifically, the study tested whether financial incentives modulate these effects, hypothesizing that rewards would enhance cognitive control and caution. The researchers utilized the "Buckets game," a computerized task where participants identified a target bucket that gradually filled with pixels over an eight-second trial. Participants could respond at any time, trading off speed for accuracy; faster responses were more difficult but allowed for more attempts. The study involved 67 undergraduate participants divided into two groups: an unpaid group (n=45 after exclusions) compensated with course credit, and a paid group (n=20) receiving financial rewards contingent on performance ($10 base plus 5 cents per correct response). The design allowed for the assessment of post-error adjustments in response time and accuracy using traditional, robust, and matched statistical methods to control for confounds like fatigue and response speed biases. Contrary to established literature on rapid-choice tasks, the study found no evidence of post-error slowing in either group. Instead, unpaid participants exhibited post-error speeding and a significant hot hand effect, indicating they responded faster and performed better following errors, despite the hot hand typically being considered a fallacy. In contrast, financial incentives significantly altered behavior: paid participants adopted a more cautious approach following errors, avoiding the recklessness seen in the unpaid group. The payment manipulation successfully improved overall accuracy and game scores for the paid group, confirming that incentives enhanced motivation and cognitive control. The findings suggest that the impact of success and failure on subsequent performance is highly dependent on task characteristics and motivational context. The absence of post-error slowing and the presence of post-error recklessness in unpaid participants indicate that without external incentives, individuals may not engage in the cautious adjustments typically observed in laboratory settings. Conversely, financial rewards promoted a strategy of caution after errors, aligning with theoretical models linking motivation to cognitive control. These results imply that generalizations from simple, rapid-choice tasks to more complex, goal-driven behaviors require careful consideration of incentive structures and task demands.

Key finding

Financial incentives caused participants to adopt a cautious approach following errors, while unpaid participants exhibited post-error speeding and a hot hand effect, indicating that motivation and task structure fundamentally alter sequential performance dependencies.

Methodology

lab_experiment

Sample size: 67

Provenance

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Topics

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• human error taxonomy