Automaticity: A Theoretical and Conceptual Analysis.

Moors, Agnes; De Houwer, Jan · 2006 · OpenAlex-citations

DOI: 10.1037/0033-2909.132.2.297

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Summary

This paper provides a theoretical and conceptual analysis of automaticity, addressing the lack of consensus regarding its definition in psychology. The authors examine whether the various features commonly associated with automaticity—such as being unintentional, uncontrolled, goal-independent, autonomous, stimulus-driven, unconscious, efficient, and fast—can be disentangled on a conceptual level. This separation is deemed necessary to justify contemporary approaches that investigate these features independently rather than as a unified construct. The authors review several major theoretical frameworks, beginning with the "capacity view," which defines automaticity as processing that requires minimal attentional resources. This view evolved from early single-channel models to capacity models where attention is a flexible resource. Within this framework, automatic processes were often characterized by a fixed set of features (e.g., Shiffrin and Schneider’s "four horsemen": efficient, unintentional, uncontrollable, and unconscious). However, empirical evidence showing a lack of co-occurrence among these features challenged the "all-or-none" dichotomy between automatic and nonautomatic processes. In response, Logan proposed a "gradual view," suggesting that automaticity is a continuum determined by practice, with different features evolving at different rates. Logan further advanced a "construct-based" approach, defining automaticity specifically as single-step memory retrieval, thereby replacing feature-based diagnosis with process-based identification. Alternatively, the "algorithm strengthening view" posits that automatization results from the improvement of existing algorithms rather than a shift to memory retrieval. The authors conclude that the conceptual analysis of automaticity features is largely feasible, supporting the separate investigation of these properties. They argue that assumptions of overlap among features are often driven by researchers' specific views of automaticity and their underlying models of information processing, rather than inherent conceptual inseparability. The paper advocates for a return to a feature-based approach, such as Bargh’s conditional approach, which identifies "autonomy" (running to completion without conscious guidance) as the minimal criterion for automaticity. By distinguishing between the definition, explanation, and diagnosis of automaticity, the authors suggest that researchers should avoid circular reasoning inherent in construct-based definitions. Instead, they recommend analyzing specific features to understand the nature of mental processes, acknowledging that no single feature is necessary or sufficient for all cases of automaticity. This approach allows for a more nuanced understanding of how different processes operate across various psychological domains.

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• automaticity skill acquisition