Vision Zero

Belin, Matts-Åke; Tillgren, Per · 2012 · Crossref

DOI: 10.58235/sjpa.v16i3.16258

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Summary

This paper evaluates the implementation of Sweden’s "Vision Zero" road safety policy, specifically focusing on the legislative process to formalize the responsibility of "system designers" (e.g., road administrations, municipalities, vehicle manufacturers) for preventing serious injuries. Adopted by the Swedish Parliament in 1997, Vision Zero shifted the primary safety responsibility from individual road users to those who design and operate the transport system. The study investigates two main questions: how the legislative process to codify this responsibility progressed between 1997 and 2009, and what factors explain the implementation outcome. The authors employ a process evaluation approach based on a goal attainment model and implementation theory. The methodology relies on a comprehensive analysis of official key documents, including parliamentary directives, inquiry reports, and legislative proposals, retrieved from the Swedish parliamentary database. The study frames the implementation process through four explanatory factors: the complexity of the intervention, conflicts of interest, other government efforts, and external processes such as European Union directives. The target group for legislation was defined broadly as any public or private agency responsible for designing or operating parts of the road transport system. The findings indicate that the goal of legally formalizing system designers' responsibility was only minimally realized during the study period. Despite multiple inquiries recommending a general safety liability law, no comprehensive legislation was enacted. Instead, the process resulted in the creation of the Swedish Transport Agency in 2009 and the adoption of the Road Safety Act (SFS 2010:1362), which imposed systematic safety measures only on road administrators for the Trans European Network (TEN) roads, rather than all system designers. The government rejected broader application due to concerns over excessive costs and regulatory burden. The authors identify conflicts of interest and the complexity of defining liability for diverse stakeholders as significant barriers. Additionally, external EU directives influenced the process, leading to partial implementation limited to specific road networks. The significance of the study lies in its nuanced interpretation of implementation failure. While the low level of legal formalization suggests a classic implementation failure under a goal attainment model, the process evaluation suggests otherwise. The authors argue that transforming a principled policy stance into formal regulation is a long-term process and that formal legislation is not the only mechanism for ensuring responsibility. Consequently, the study concludes that it may be premature to categorize the outcome as a failure, as the policy innovation may still prevail through other means and gradual regulatory adjustments.

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• traffic safety culture