More than a memory: Confirmatory visual search is not caused by remembering a visual feature

Rajsic, Jason; Pratt, Jay · 2017 · Crossref

DOI: 10.1016/j.actpsy.2017.09.010

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Summary

This study investigates the cognitive mechanisms underlying "confirmatory visual search," a phenomenon where observers exhibit a bias toward processing information that confirms a hypothesis (e.g., searching for green objects when asked if a target is green) rather than disconfirming it. Previous research suggested this bias might be an involuntary consequence of holding a specific visual feature in working memory, which automatically captures attention. Rajsic and Pratt (2017) tested this "memory-driven capture" hypothesis against the alternative explanation that the bias results from a specific attentional selection strategy employed during hypothesis testing. The researchers conducted two experiments using visual search tasks where participants identified target letters amidst distractors. In both experiments, participants were divided into two conditions: a "positive information" condition, where they reported whether a target matched a specific color (e.g., "Is the target green?"), and a "working memory" condition, where they performed a different search task (e.g., detecting target presence or location) while simultaneously holding the same color in memory for a subsequent test. This design allowed the authors to isolate the effect of maintaining a color in memory from the effect of using that color as a search criterion. Experiment 1 included target-absent trials, while Experiment 2 used only target-present trials to ensure that negative information could effectively disconfirm the hypothesis, thereby strengthening the test of the confirmation bias. The results demonstrated that confirmatory search biases—specifically, search slopes that slowed proportionally to the number of items matching the color in memory—occurred only in the positive information condition. In the working memory condition, where the color was held in memory but not used as the primary search instruction, search slopes were significantly flatter, indicating that attention was not involuntarily captured by the remembered feature. However, both conditions showed a response-time advantage for targets that matched the color held in memory, suggesting that memory contents facilitate the recognition stage of search but do not drive the guidance stage. These findings indicate that confirmatory visual search is not caused merely by the presence of a visual feature in working memory. Instead, it reflects a strategic attentional selection process tied to the specific goals of the search task. The authors conclude that top-down guidance of attention involves more than just maintaining information in memory; it requires cognitive processes that bind memory contents to specific actions or instructions. This distinction supports the view that confirmation bias in visual search is a heuristic strategy for efficient hypothesis testing rather than an involuntary byproduct of memory maintenance.

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• visual search