Miscommunications Based on Different Meanings of “Safe” and Their Implications for the Meaning of Safe System

Sakashita, Chika; Job, R. F. Soames; Belin, Matts-Åke · 2022 · Crossref

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-76505-7_49

archive: archived pipeline: cataloged verified

Get this paper ↗ (DOI — opens at the source; we link to it, we don't host it)

Summary

This paper addresses the persistent failure of global road safety initiatives to achieve the Vision Zero goal of eliminating deaths and serious injuries. The authors argue that this stagnation stems from a fundamental lack of rigorous, agreed-upon definition for the term “safe” within the Safe System approach. Specifically, the paper identifies a critical miscommunication arising from the conflation of two inconsistent definitions of safety: probabilistic and absolute. While many countries have adopted Safe System frameworks, the ambiguity in terminology hinders the implementation of strategies necessary to reach zero fatalities. The authors conduct a conceptual analysis of the adjective “safe” by examining authoritative dictionary definitions and reviewing international road safety policy documents. They categorize definitions into two types: probabilistic, which defines safety as having low risk or being unlikely to cause harm, and absolute, which defines safety as being free from harm, danger, or risk entirely. The paper contrasts these definitions using analogies, such as water safety, to illustrate how probabilistic approaches focus on reducing danger (e.g., removing sharks) while ignoring systemic risks that still cause fatalities (e.g., drowning). The authors then apply this framework to road safety, analyzing how current design standards and policy guidelines implicitly rely on probabilistic definitions. The findings reveal that road design and engineering standards typically aim for probabilistic safety, ensuring roads do not inherently cause crashes, rather than absolute safety, which would prevent deaths regardless of user error. Consequently, roads are often deemed “safe” because they meet design guidelines, even though fatalities continue to occur. The paper highlights that this probabilistic mindset permeates Safe System implementations, particularly in the interpretation of “shared responsibility.” Many global strategies incorrectly assign responsibility for safety to road users, implying that user error is an acceptable risk. Furthermore, the authors note that “Safe System Speed Limits” are often defined based on a 10% probability of death in crashes, which contradicts the absolute requirement of zero deaths. This acceptance of residual risk undermines the core premise of Vision Zero. The significance of this work lies in its call for a semantic and conceptual shift in road safety policy. The authors conclude that to achieve Vision Zero, the Safe System must strictly adopt the absolute definition of safe. This requires a system that protects users from fatal forces regardless of their behavior or errors, placing ultimate responsibility on system designers rather than sharing it with fallible road users. The paper argues that clarifying this distinction is essential to eliminate victim-blaming cultures, drive genuine systemic changes, and finally deliver on the promise of zero deaths and serious injuries.

Provenance

The full processing record for this entry. Every stage of this paper's journey through the pipeline is logged — what ran, with which tool and model, how many attempts it took, and when it last completed.

Summary generated by qwen3.6-27b-prismaquant on 2026-06-26; verification: verified.

Topics

Ranked by relevance to this paper. Hover a topic for its definition.

• traffic safety culture