Cognition as a dynamic system: Principles from embodiment
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Summary
Smith reviews evidence and arguments for a dynamic-systems, embodied-cognition account of cognitive development as an alternative to traditional cognitivism, which treats concepts as stable, perceiver-independent symbolic structures. The embodiment hypothesis holds that intelligence emerges from an organism's sensorimotor coupling with its environment, so cognition is in-the-moment, body-dependent, and self-organizing rather than the output of static symbolic representations. Smith uses developmental findings to argue that the continual coupling of cognition to the world through the body adapts cognition to the here-and-now, makes it relevant to action, and supplies the mechanism for developmental change. The paper is theoretical and integrative rather than empirical.
Key finding
Cognition is best characterized as a self-organizing dynamic system grounded in sensorimotor coupling rather than as the manipulation of stable, body-independent symbolic concepts.
Methodology
Theoretical review and conceptual analysis published in Developmental Review; integrates dynamic-systems theory with embodied-cognition findings to argue against representation-centric accounts of cognitive development.
Quality score: 5 / 5